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Ever since the Old Testament patriarch Joseph advised Pharaoh to store grain against the risk of an impending famine, stockpiling for sup-ply disruptions has been common practice. In the 20th century, ensuring adequate supplies of petroleum and its products emerged as a strategic issue during World War I when it 
became apparent that modern armies and economies require 
an uninterrupted flow of energy. Creating a strategic reserve of 
petroleum against the threat of disruption was first proposed 
toward the end of World War II. Various proposals were revisited 
in the 1950s, but it was not until the events of 1973–1974—the 
often-called “Arab oil embargo”—that President Richard Nixon 
made protecting the United States against petroleum supply 
interruption a matter of policy. Building and maintaining a large 
strategic reserve of petroleum was a cornerstone of this policy. 
The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) was commissioned in 
1975 by President Gerald Ford. The nations of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development were advised to 
keep three months or so of supply in storage; with a capacity of 
727 million barrels, the SPR is the world’s largest such reserve.
Although the SPR was created to address import disruptions, 
over the years its role has expanded. It has been used repeatedly 
for situations deemed of national importance related to price 
stabilization. During the first Gulf War, draw-downs were autho-
rized, as well as during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and Hurricane 
Harvey in 2017. Following the Libyan revolution of 2011, the U.S. 
government, in coordination with other OECD countries, released 
30 million barrels of petroleum from the SPR as a means of stabi-
lizing markets. In total, oil has been released 11 times in response 
to domestic disruptions, including six caused by hurricanes. 
After nearly half a century of operations, the facility is in 
extreme need of upgrades and re-investment. As a consequence 
of a 2016 long-term review of the SPR by the U.S. Department 
of Energy, Congress was advised that $375 million was needed 
for urgent repairs and that at least $2 billion is needed to ensure 
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long-term operation. The current tensions in the Persian Gulf 
offer us an ideal time to evaluate the SPR. 
COSTS VERSUS BENEFITS
Providing even a few months of import protection for an econ-
omy as large as the United States does not come cheap. To date, 
about $5 billion has been spent on the SPR and over $20 billion 
in filling it with crude oil. Although the salt caverns that have 
been hollowed out in Louisiana and Texas for storage are literally 
and figuratively sunk costs, maintaining and managing the SPR 
has over time represented approximately 20% of its total cost. 
In addition, there is the opportunity cost of the money used to 
keep oil in the SPR as opposed to that money being in the bank 
or being used to reduce the national fiscal deficit. While the oil 
in the SPR has been acquired at different price levels, marking-
to-market at today’s $60 per barrel price and assuming a cost of 
capital of 3% results in an opportunity cost exceeding $1.2 billion 
per annum for the SPR.
In addition to the opportunity cost of capital, there is the 
opportunity cost of not operating the SPR in a commercial 
manner, as is the practice of major integrated oil companies with 
privately owned storage facilities for crude oil, petroleum prod-
ucts, and natural gas. A facility such as the SPR, if commercially 
operated, would be “cycled” with daily injections or withdrawals 
of around 4.5 million barrels per day (MMbd) according to oppor-
tunities for arbitraging the differences between actual storage 
costs (cost-of-carry) and the cost of hedging in futures markets.
To appreciate the value potential in operating physical stor-
age, one must understand futures markets. 
Futures markets are best understood as a 
means of artificial or synthetic storage. If a 
business fears higher or lower prices in the 
future for a key commodity (imagine jet 
fuel for airlines), then it can purchase the 
commodity now and pay the opportunity 
cost of capital not being in the bank earn-
ing interest. Alternatively, rather than actu-
ally purchasing the commodity and storing 
it, the business could take a position in the 
futures market, short or long depending 
upon underlying requirements. In equi-
librium, both approaches should have the 
same cost, minus the actual cost of storing 
a physical commodity adjusted for the con-
venience of having the commodity at hand 
immediately. As one of many strategies, if 
financing oil in storage (“the carry cost,” in 
trader parlance) is less than the premium 
someone purchasing oil for future delivery 
would pay on the New York Mercantile 
Exchange, then someone with access to 
physical storage could make money by 
purchasing oil, storing it, and promising 
delivery in the future. A trader with physi-
cal storage can profit whenever the futures 
market is not aligned with financing costs. 
What is the value potential from trad-
ing around physical storage capacity? As 
physical storage confers flexibility, it may 
be valued as the right to exchange, for 
example, March crude oil for June crude 
oil. Although the value potential is a func-
tion of assumptions about prices (vari-
ances in prices commonly known as vola-
tility) and correlations now and into the 
future (given the size of the SPR), the value PH
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potential from cycling a facility of this scale would be huge. To the 
extent that the SPR is not used in this manner, there is the addi-
tional opportunity cost of a non-economically optimized asset. 
PETROLEUM MARKETS, THEN AND NOW
Recent debates around maintaining the SPR have focused upon 
the changing conditions in global petroleum markets. The world 
today uses about 40% more petroleum daily than it did in 1975. 
Yet, from slightly over 40% in 1980, today’s production from 
OPEC members has fallen to about 37% of total global produc-
tion. Moreover, OPEC members now consume more of their own 
production because of their own economic development. Thus, 
OPEC’s net contribution to global markets is around 30%.
Notwithstanding previous concerns of the 1990s that oil pro-
duction had “peaked,” today we have entire new regions of the 
world such as Angola, Brazil, the deep off-shore, and the Arctic 
contributing to global supply. New exploration frontiers have 
opened in Africa and South America. In the United States, it was 
once forecast that oil production in the Lower 48 would now be 
in a two-decade-long decline, yet we are seeing the opposite. A 
revolution in exploration and production driven by such techno-
logical advances as directional drilling and the recovery of deposits 
from “tight seams” through hydraulic fracturing have substantially 
enhanced the United States’ supply position and energy security.
Since the SPR was built, U.S. dependence on imported petro-
leum, especially from OPEC nations, has decreased markedly. 
Today, the United States is the world’s largest producer, with 
production exceeding 12 MMbd. And U.S. consumption of oil 
peaked around 2005 at 20.8 MMbd; today it is about half a billion 
barrels per day less, reflecting the falling energy intensiveness of 
America’s gross domestic product as well as the increasing role 
of other energy sources such as renewables. Global supplies of 
petroleum are much more diversified than they were half a century 
ago and U.S. exposure to import disruption is greatly reduced. 
ENERGY SECURITY AND VULNERABILITY
For many decades now, measuring energy market security has been 
a concern for both policymakers and academics. The U.S. DOE 
and the International Energy Agency of the OECD have used large-
scale economic models to measure the economic effects of supply 
disruptions. Even though there is a global market for crude oil and 
products, the focus of such models tends to be at the country or 
regional level, examining exposure and resilience to disruptions. 
Large-scale simulation models in which economic agents respond 
to price signals, undertake investment, and change patterns of 
consumption are used to inform policy design but may have 
limited scope for analysing the effects of short-term disruptions.
In academic research, the focus tends toward the development 
and calibration of metrics to measure energy market security. 
Some researchers look at the balance of supply and demand, 
consider resource estimates, examine the ratio of imports to 
domestic production or measures of economic structure such as 
producer concentration, and incorporate such factors as energy 
intensiveness, price elasticity, and market conditions.
These efforts are interesting and tell us much about vulner-
ability and resilience, but they do not tell us about the probability 
of a supply disruption taking place. These models focus upon 
exposure to disruption and the ability of a nation or region to 
absorb the effects of such an event, but they do not probe the 
chances that it may happen. 
That these modeling efforts ignore the probability of a disrup-
tion occurring is curious. The arguments for maintaining the 
SPR surely should include the probability of a disruption taking 
place. In the insurance and finance literature, three parameters 
are used to characterize a risk: 
■■ the exposure to potential loss if the event occurs 
■■ the scope for mitigation or loss absorption within a 
specified time frame
■■ the probability of the event happening
The probability of supply disruption is important because we 
repeatedly see major events in oil market that appear capable of 
interrupting physical supply and affecting prices, but markets 
absorb the shocks and remain resilient. In 2016 we saw sabotage 
in Kirkuk, a strike in Kuwait, the Canadian wildfire, Nigeria’s 
force majeure, export blockage in Libya, Colombian pipeline 
disruptions, Italy’s Val d’Agri shutdown, and fire at Brazil’s Bar-
racuda–Caratinga site. These were all serious events; none of them, 
Table 1
Data Sets
DATA SET DATES AVERAGE  
PRICE
AVERAGE  
VOLATILITY
1990–1991  
Gulf War
June 15, 1990 
to March 1, 
1991
$26.73 76.87%
The 2008  
Financial Crisis
January 2, 2008 
to December 
31, 2008
$96.94 42.73%
The Arab Spring April 1, 2011 to 
June 30, 2011
$117.01 31.73%
Table 2
Price and Volatility Statistics
Data Sets Expected 
Price
Minimum Maximum Historic 
Volatility 
1990–1991 Gulf War: 
low prices and high 
volatility
$26.32 $18.71 $34.75 76.87%
 2008 Financial  
Crisis: very high prices 
and high volatility
$94.59 $67.86 $126.03 42.37%
2011 Arab Spring: high 
prices and  
moderate volatility
$115.38 $81.91 $152.12 31.73%
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however, led to disruptions or affected oil prices, which continued 
to trade in a range of $26 to $54 per barrel. Similar observations 
may be made for 2017, when—despite OPEC’s production cuts—
market liquidity was unaffected. In 2018, the wave of political 
protests across Iran along with sanctions led to sharp declines 
in production, but global markets for oil remained stable, with 
Brent trading between $50 to $86 per barrel and historically steady 
price variability. Today, Venezuela produces about one-third of 
what it pumped in the 1970s for reasons that are well-known, but 
markets remain stable. 
Looking further back in history, during the Suez conflict of 
1956, oil production from the Middle East was reduced by approxi-
mately 1.7 MMbd in November. But the effects were short-lived, 
with production restored to normal by February 1957. Notwith-
standing what was portrayed in the popular press, the cutbacks 
associated with the Iranian Revolution in 1978–1989 led to no 
global oil supply disruption despite many worrisome predictions. 
Interestingly, those supply reductions that were disruptive 
historically also involved government intervention. The supply 
disruption in the summer of 1951 resulted from an orchestrated 
response to the Iranian nationalization of its oil industry. A global 
boycott of its production removed 19 million barrels per month 
of production from global markets. The effects of the boycott 
were exacerbated by the U.S. domestic price controls in place dur-
ing the Korean War. Similarly, it has been argued that the effect 
of the 1973–1974 Arab oil embargo, including the long queues 
for transportation fuels in major U.S. cities at the time, resulted 
from the Nixon administration’s imposition of price controls 
and the misallocation of transportation 
fuels between Petroleum Administrative 
Districts (PADS) by the U.S. Department 
of Energy. Recent and historical events 
show the resilience of global petroleum 
markets. On those historic occasions 
when markets were less resilient, govern-
ment policies played a pivotal role in 
market disruption. 
THE PROBABILITY OF SUPPLY 
DISRUPTION
The United States, like other countries 
of the OECD, follows the IEA’s 90-day 
import replacement guidance on mini-
mum stockholding requirements. But is 
this sufficient or is it wasteful? 
The various models facilitate compar-
ing the costs with the benefits of having 
a reserve to augment supply during dis-
ruption if an event has taken place, but 
they ignore the fact that such events are 
exceedingly rare. This oversight seems 
questionable. Given the infrequency of 
supply disruptions, as we have documented, how can we con-
struct a probability distribution that assesses economic insecurity 
and resiliency? How can we compare the expected costs with the 
expected benefits?
In the recent Energy Strategy Reviews article “A Financial Option 
Perspective on Energy Security and Strategic Storage,” Laura Haar 
and I try to answer these questions. To introduce the probability of 
disruption into the measurement of energy security, we derive prob-
abilities from traded option prices. Usefully, the forward-looking 
nature of option markets embodies the views of participants about 
prices in the future. Markets for crude oil, petroleum products, 
and natural gas hold the attention of countless agents seeking to 
secure supplies, hedge exposures, speculate, and take advantage of 
anomalies through arbitrage. We argue that option prices provide 
better insights into energy security and the threat of disruption 
than the metrics and models currently used by policymakers.
Traders put a premium on options that are deeply in-the-money, 
such as the right to purchase crude oil at $50 when the market is 
at $60, or to sell crude oil at $70 when the market is trading at 
$60. From the size of these premiums for deeply in-the-money 
and out-of-the money options, we can derive probabilities across a 
distribution of future prices. If oil market disruptions were antici-
pated, then greater probability would be attached to extreme prices, 
as calculated using well-known option-pricing formulas. 
Unlike relying upon “experts,” we use the information embed-
ded in traded option prices representing the collective views of 
millions of buyers, sellers, and oil traders globally. We use pub-
lished data from the International Commodity Exchange (ICE) 
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on option prices and volatilities for the crude oil 
benchmark, Brent, to determine the probabilities 
attached by the world’s traders to extreme prices 
embedded in option prices, allowing us to infer 
the chances of supply–demand imbalances. 
THREE CASE STUDIES
Reflecting upon whether the SPR was needed 
historically, Haar and I examine the perceptions 
of traders through the probabilities embedded 
in option prices during three periods when pun-
dits and even “experts” conjectured that prices 
might rise inexorably. Using our method, we 
compute risk-neutral probability histograms for 
the periods shown in Table 1, with the results 
summarized in Table 2. From the probability 
histograms we can determine the market’s 
expectation of future prices. 
Beginning with the implied risk-neutral his-
togram for the Brent crude oil prices during 
the 1990–1991 Gulf War, we see in Figure 1 that, 
over the dates shown, the market expectation of 
future prices was slightly skewed to the left. In 
the views of the trading community, there was 
a greater probability of prices falling. Although 
price volatility (a measure calculated from a 
rolling 30-day standard deviation of percentage 
change in price annualized to a business year of 
252 trading days) at the time was high (77%), as reported in Table 
1, the expected price for the year was around $26 per barrel. Not-
withstanding extreme scenarios of how the Gulf War might unfold, 
market participants pricing options did not believe disruptions 
were likely: the probability of greater prices was smaller than the 
probability of prices softening and the probability of extremely 
low or high prices was much lower than the expected price of $26. 
As shown in Figure 1, the probabilities ascribed to tail-events 
grew smaller over time. Traveling forward in time from the front 
of our three-dimensional graph to the back, the total probability 
of extreme high prices decreased dramatically (the red, green, 
purple, and blue areas decrease). The day after the United States 
and its allies attacked Iraq, oil prices in London and New York 
plunged an unprecedented $10.56 a barrel to $21.44, 10¢ below 
its price the day before Iraq invaded Kuwait. The price remained in 
this range throughout the conflict. Market participants correctly 
discounted any effect upon oil prices from the conflict. 
We next turned to the 2008 Financial Crisis. Our findings are 
shown in Figure 2. Moving forward in time, we see that the total 
probability of extreme high prices (blue and red areas) decreased 
and the overall distribution of expected prices flattened. Emer-
gency policies from central banks had not commenced and the 
potential for shale oil in the United States was yet unknown. As 
the year progressed, the distribution grew flatter, with growing 
market uncertainty. Although the shockwaves from the financial 
crisis were only beginning to reverberate, probability attached to 
extreme scenarios such as demand collapsing grew smaller. As 
summarized in Table 2, according to constructed probability dis-
tributions, the mean expectation was that oil prices would remain 
at just over $90 per barrel. As reflected in markets, oil prices during 
the financial crisis were high, but volatility only increased sharply 
toward the end of the year. It reached 103% for Brent crude on 
December 16th, as shown in the flattening distribution in Figure 
2. Although the widening financial crisis added to oil market 
risks, based upon option prices, market participants were still 
anticipating reliable supplies at prevailing price levels and again 
proved prescient. Even with the ensuing banking collapses and 
the sovereign debt crisis, oil markets continued to function. 
During the Arab Spring of 2011, the average prices of crude 
oil were high while volatility was moderate. As the crisis unfolded, 
by December 2010 some analysts were predicting that the demon-
strations in Tunisia would lead to supply-chain disruptions and 
a sharp rise in oil prices. As unrest spread to other countries, the 
threat of interruption gained credibility. The IEA coordinated a 
draw-down of strategic reserves to calm markets. The threat of 
civil unrest spreading to the Gulf, for example, was raised and 
calamitous scenarios were suggested.
But there were some dissenting voices. A report from the Oxford 
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Institute for Energy Studies warned against alarmism, arguing that 
oil markets are remarkably resilient and that the basic conditions 
of supply and demand were unlikely to change. A paper from the 
United Kingdom think tank Chatham House on the Arab upris-
ing drew similar conclusions. Interestingly, from the probabilities 
derived from option prices, we see in Figure 3 a flattish distribution, 
reflecting a divergence of views. Compared with the previous two 
histograms, the distribution was flatter because market participants 
attached greater probabilities to prices becoming both higher and 
lower. According to option markets, the median view was for prices 
to remain around $120 per barrel. We see throughout the period 
only slight weight was given to prices going even higher, but like 
the dissenting voices, the market appears not to have taken seri-
ously the possibility of extreme prices. Petroleum market traders 
were not attaching large probabilities to extreme events. There 
were probabilities attached to higher prices; the distribution was 
flattish, but the median of the distribution still had the greatest 
mass. In contrast to the doomsayers, the market perception was 
that petroleum supply and demand were sufficiently resilient to 
weather the various events of 2011.
Our examination of probabilities derived from option prices 
are illustrative. They neither prove that markets are always resilient 
nor that disruptions cannot take place. But the results support 
the following points: 
■■ The common challenge of constructing probability distribu-
tions on rare events may be overcome through the informa-
tion embedded in traded option prices. 
■■ From a policymaking perspective, examining a potential 
loss if the event occurs and the scope for mitigation or loss 
absorption, without weighing the probability of the event 
taking place, provides limited insight. 
■■ In the periods examined, markets were not anticipating 
extrema as might occur under a disruption scenario.
As shown in Table 2, markets did not expect price spikes and 
the prices to which even small probability events were ascribed 
were not outliers. Arguably, according to forward-looking price 
estimates obtained from the risk-neutral density functions, mar-
kets were not anticipating supply disruptions and proved accurate: 
participants correctly foresaw that market shortfalls or disrup-
tions were unlikely. Even with output from some producers falling, 
in the periods examined, markets were not anticipating price lev-
els consistent with disruptions or other forms of supply insecurity. 
If, during these volatile situations, traded markets attached 
only small probabilities to price extremes as might occur through 
supply disruption, it seems fair to ask whether maintaining the 
SPR is justified. If, during these three historical cases, the SPR 
was not needed, should the United States continue supporting it?
THE SPR AS A MARKET STABILIZER
National storage of crude oil is widely seen as a precaution-
ary public good designed to mitigate the effect of severe and 
sustained import disruption. Yet, petroleum products are both 
excludable and rivalrous in nature. Privately owned crude oil 
inventories in the United States frequently exceed 500 million 
barrels, or about three-quarters of the SPR volume. Should the 
United States store all that petroleum? If the SPR is not needed 
because petroleum markets are resilient, is there a role for govern-
ment in reducing or eliminating risk even if the probability of 
disruption and extreme price scenarios is remote? 
Like requiring medical insurance or mandating saving for 
retirement, might expenditure on storage be justified to avoid 
free-riders? Might negative externalities arise through insufficient 
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management of risk? Is there a case for reducing 
risk in petroleum markets, and how might it be 
measured? 
Although the SPR was created to address import 
disruptions, over the years it has been used instead 
for price stabilization during such events as the 
Gulf War, the collapse of the Libyan regime, and 
various hurricanes. Repeatedly, the SPR has been 
used to calm markets in this fashion even though 
oil producers, consumers, and traders have avail-
able liquid global markets in options and futures 
to hedge exposures and manage risks. If petroleum 
markets are resilient and robust to disruptions, 
might using a strategic reserve to dampen market 
volatility—making markets more predictable and 
reducing or even eliminating the cost of hedging—
be justified as a public good? 
Formally, the decision on how much of a public good should 
be produced requires finding the level of production that equates 
marginal social benefits with marginal social costs. Holding physi-
cal storage at a known price is an alternative to risk-managing 
the exposure using options. In Figure 4 we compare the marginal 
benefit from risk reduction using the prices of European call 
options with the approximate costs per annum of managing the 
SPR. As the figure indicates, unless volatility is reduced by about 
20% (from an assumed volatility of 50% to about 40%), the costs 
of maintaining the SPR (shown by the red line) are not covered. 
Although the results can be re-calibrated to a different assumed 
initial volatility, these results reflect historical volatility values. 
It would be hard to justify spending $2 billion in fresh funds 
today on maintaining and upgrading the SPR, given the benefits 
in risk reduction shown in Figure 4. 
One would need to see market volatility reduced from 50% (by 
assumption) to 30%, or a nearly 40% reduction in market risk, for 
the benefits of volatility reduction (as shown by the blue line) to 
exceed the cost of risk reduction (as shown by the green line) to 
justify the investment in maintaining the SPR. And this would 
occur only if the SPR were used presciently, selling when the mar-
ket is tightening and purchasing when the market is loosening.
CONCLUSION
There might be a case for keeping the SPR if it were actively 
used to dampen market volatility, but the gains would need 
to be large. And the management of exposure to petroleum 
markets is not a public good as economists define the term. 
From airlines to car manufacturers to oil companies, everyone 
has the right to manage exposure to oil prices according to 
the risk–reward tolerance of shareholders. There is no reason 
to believe that the benefits of risk management may be under-
consumed, creating social costs and externalities. (Perhaps one 
could argue that the existence of such reserves helps to deter 
certain oil-producing countries from trying to exert their mar-
ket power, but this is difficult to establish.)
Indeed, having strategic reserves may even contribute to 
moral hazard because parties that should manage their own 
risks become free-riders, like financial institutions relying on the 
Federal Reserve as a “lender of last resort.” This possibility has 
been noted in agricultural futures in the United States where, 
despite scope for hedging of exposures, farmers prefer to rely 
upon price supports from the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Petroleum markets, like the world itself, will remain a risky 
place. Given the historical resilience of petroleum markets to 
quiet severe shocks, the scope for private parties to manage their 
own risks, and the costs of maintaining the SPR, the hard-earned 
dollars of U.S. taxpayers could be better spent. 
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